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Abstract:  
Demand forecasting is critical to sales and operations planning (S&OP), but the effects of sales 
promotions can be difficult to forecast. Typically, a baseline statistical forecast is judgmentally adjusted 
on receipt of information from different departments. However, much of this information either has no 
predictive value or its value is unknown. Research into base rate discounting has suggested that such 
information may distract forecasters from the average uplift and reduce accuracy. This has been 
investigated in situations in which forecasters were able to adjust the statistical forecasts for promotions 
via a forecasting support system (FSS). In two ecologically valid experiments, forecasters were provided 
with the mean level of promotion uplift, a baseline statistical forecast, and quantitative and qualitative 
information. However, the forecasters were distracted from the base rate and misinterpreted the 
information available to them. These findings have important implications for the design of organizational 
S&OP processes, and for the implementation of FSSs.  
Key Words: Sales and Operations Planning; behavioral operations; information effects; forecaster 
behavior; judgmental forecasting 
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1. Introduction 
Production and inventory planning, scheduling, logistics, marketing and finance in supply chain 
companies all rely on short-term disaggregate forecasts at the SKU level. However, little research has 
been carried out into the way in which such forecasts are actually produced, or the factors that influence 
their effectiveness (Thomé, Scavarda, Fernandez, & Scavarda, 2012; Tuomikangas & Kaipia, 2014; 
Seifert, Siemsen, Hadida, & Eisingerich, 2015). In contrast to the academic research literature, the 
practitioner literature is awash with descriptions and recommendations of ways in which ‘Sales and 
Operations Planning (S&OP)’ processes can be used to effectively integrate cross-functional information 
in order to produce forecasts (e.g., Lapide, 2007; Stahl, 2010). The demand uplifts achieved through sales 
promotions campaigns can be particularly difficult to forecast because of the relative infrequency of such 
events. When promotion campaigns are due to take place, the forecasts within S&OP are usually 
produced as a combination of a simple baseline statistical forecast and a judgmental adjustment, which is 
an estimate of the promotion effect (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007). The adjustments are made so as to reflect 
the information received from different departments, such as sales and marketing. These adjustments may 
mirror individual and functional biases that stemming from informational blind spots, as well as from 
other organizational misalignments in supply chain processes (Oliva & Watson, 2009, 2011). 
In one of the few detailed case studies of forecasting practice, Goodwin, Lee, Fildes, Nikolopoulos, 
and Lawrence (2007) found that the benefits of judgmental adjustments based on additional information 
within a pharmaceutical company were slight and often negative. Other studies have found evidence of 
information use being inefficient and biased (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009; Franses 
& Legerstee, 2010, 2011, 2013), meaning that adjustments can have a deleterious effect on the forecast 
accuracy where promotions are concerned (Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes, & Kourentzes, 2013). While the 
consensus is that integrating diverse sources of information is valuable (Kremer, Siemsen, & Thomas, 
2016) and that forecast information sharing affects supply chain performance, usually to improve it (e.g., 
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Özer and Raz, 2011; Özer, Zheng, & Chen, 2011), no studies have examined either the nature of the 
information that was available or the way in which it was used.   
One possible cause of damaging judgmental adjustments may be that too much attention is paid to 
information relating to single, isolated past events, such as one past promotion. Because the effects of 
such events are subject to noise, they offer little or no diagnosticity1 when forecasting the effects of 
similar future events. A second possible cause may be that information with an unknown diagnosticity is 
overweighted when the judgmental adjustment is estimated. For example, a sales uplift of 80% may be 
estimated when a top celebrity is recruited to front an advertising campaign for a product, but there may 
be no information available to support such a judgment, with its typical effects being unknown. The 
attention that is paid to these two types of information may lead to the neglect of available base rate 
information, which may indicate, for example, that promotions in the relevant product group or category 
lead to an average uplift of 50% (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
Using controlled experimentation with realistic simulations of the supply chain forecaster’s task 
environment when sales promotions are imminent, this paper aims to help address the gap in our 
knowledge of how information is used for forecasting. (Note that the term ‘supply chain forecaster’ refers 
to a demand forecaster who is based in a company that forms part of a supply chain that includes both 
retailers and manufacturers.) It does this by identifying the response of supply-chain-based forecasters 
when they have base rate information that indicates the average sales uplift achieved during sales 
promotions, together with other information that has little or unknown diagnosticity – a situation that is 
common in S&OP settings. Promotions were shown by Fildes and Goodwin (2007) to be the most 
important reason for judgmental adjustments of demand forecasts, and they are used in this study as an 
integral part of providing an ecologically valid supply chain forecasting task. 
Our research makes three important contributions to the literature. First, it addresses a gap in our 
knowledge of the ways in which diverse information is used by judgmental forecasters when predicting 
                                            
1 “The diagnosticity of a piece of information is a measure of its helpfulness and usefulness for making a judgment 
(or forecast) in empirical studies” (Qiu, Pang, & Lim, 2012). 
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the effects of sales promotions in the typical organizational context of a forecasting support system. Other 
researchers have investigated information use – and, specifically, the role of irrelevant information – in 
decision making in other, quite different contexts. For example, Gaeth and Shanteau (1984) examined the 
appraisal of soil types and learning effects when irrelevant materials were contained in soil. The 
participants in a study by Hutchinson and Alba (1991) attempted a visual product classification task when 
only one of a collection of pieces of information had diagnosticity. Returning to the classic Kahneman–
Tversky experiment regarding the classification of an individual as either an engineer or lawyer, Schwarz, 
Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991) focused on the effects of task framing on the neglect of base rates. 
Shelton (1999) examined auditor judgments and the effects of experience on individuals’ abilities to 
discount irrelevant information. These and various other studies cited elsewhere in the text all emphasize 
the effects of irrelevant information; however, the tasks that they have focused on are all far removed 
from the day-to-day operational tasks faced by demand forecasters. Human judgment depends strongly on 
the context and nature of the task, so the findings of these studies may not apply when it comes to the 
important task of demand forecasting in a supply chain. Second, this study investigates how the well-
known base rate neglect phenomenon applies to judgmental time series forecasting. Expanding on this, 
given that we have both qualitative and quantitative information available, we investigate how these 
different types of information are (mis)weighted. Third, the study is designed to investigate whether there 
is a tendency to underestimate the effects of special events when adjusting statistical forecasts within a 
forecasting support system. Such an underestimation might result from a tendency to anchor on the 
statistical forecasts. Taken together, the findings have important implications for a ‘value-added’ analysis, 
where the adjustments made through the organizational S&OP process are evaluated as to their 
effectiveness in improving the forecasting accuracy.  
The paper is divided into five further sections. Following a review of the relevant literature in 
Section 2, we set out our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our methodology, the participants and the 
experimental setting. The fourth and fifth sections contain the detailed results of two experiments, with 
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associated discussion. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our conclusions, as well as providing suggestions 
for further work and implications for practice. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1. Base rate distractors 
Previous work has acknowledged the importance of using an expanded information set in order to 
enhance supply chain forecasting performances. Such information may come from both internal sources 
such as marketing and operations (Fildes & Hastings, 1994), and other supply chain partners (e.g., Eksoz, 
Mansouri, & Bourlakis, 2014; Önkal & Aktas, 2011). Such an extended information set has been shown 
to be valuable in enhancing the accuracy, with consequent stock service level improvements (Cui, Allon, 
Bassamboo, & Mieghem, 2015; Trapero et al., 2013). However, there appears to have been surprisingly 
little empirical work done on the actual use of information in supply chain forecasting, particularly in the 
important case of sales promotions. When determining the extent to which a baseline statistical forecast 
should be adjusted to take into account the effect of a forthcoming sales promotion, forecasters will 
usually have access to a diverse range of information, both quantitative and qualitative. In addition to a 
base rate figure that shows the average sales uplift achieved by past promotion campaigns, this will 
typically include historic demand data, past and current baseline statistical forecasts, quantitative 
information on the most recent sales promotion, and qualitative information on various factors that are 
judged to be relevant to the success of the forthcoming promotion.  
However, one potential problem is that some of this information will have little or no predictive 
value; that is, no diagnosticity. For example, while a base rate founded on a large sample of previous 
promotions is likely to provide a reliable estimate of the typical sales uplift, the uplift achieved in the 
most recent promotion is a sample of only one observation. Using the base rate and the most recent uplift 
to forecast the uplift of a future promotion is essentially a Bayesian task of combining a prior mean uplift 
(the base rate) with the evidence from the sample of one to produce a posterior mean. This requires the 
use of the following formula (assuming that the actual uplifts are normally distributed): 
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where  m  is the posterior mean;  
m  is the prior mean;  
m is the observed sample mean (in this case, the observed past promotion, as the sample is of size one); 
σ2 is the variance of the prior distribution; 
2   is the sample variance (which is undefined, given that we have a sample of size one); and 
n is the sample size. 
If σ2 is not known to forecasters, the mean promotion uplift cannot be updated optimally based on 
this single observation, since 
2  is undefined (unless the forecaster assigns a subjective variance 
estimate to the single observation). Thus, the optimal forecasting strategy is to estimate an uplifted value 
that is close to the prior, if not identical. Despite this, there is evidence that it is mostly this latest uplift 
that gets used in promotion forecasting in practice (Cooper, Baron, Levy, Swisher, & Gogos, 1999). 
Recent observations tend to be more salient (Hutchinson & Alba, 1991), and several other judgmental 
forecasting studies have found a tendency to focus on them – and particularly on the most recent 
observation – rather than on the underlying performance of the system that produced them (e.g., 
Andreassen & Kraus, 1990; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1992, 1995; Bolger & Harvey, 1993).  
However, the tendency to use the previous promotion effect in the adjustment to the statistical 
forecast, thereby neglecting the base rate, is likely to depend on the salience of this effect. Goodwin and 
Fildes (1999) found that previous promotion effects had no influence on judgmental time series forecasts 
for promotion periods when the time series were highly noisy. Under these conditions, the previous 
effects were submerged in the large random movements of the series, and hence were not salient. In 
contrast, given the prevalence of a recency bias in judgmental forecasting, it seems likely that the 
proximity of the latest promotion to the current period will increase its salience, hence amplifying its 
influence on the forecast.  
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A second problem is that some information, such as an announcement that a particular celebrity 
has been recruited to lead a promotion campaign, may be associated with an uplift in sales, but in the 
absence of relevant data, the probable size of this effect is unknown, and may even be zero. In these and 
similar circumstances, the safest strategy is to adjust the statistical baseline forecast by estimating an 
uplift that is equivalent to the base rate. After all, some of the promotions that were used to estimate the 
base rate may also have employed celebrities (or had other characteristics that are similar to the 
forthcoming promotion), though information that would establish this is unlikely to be accessible 
immediately. Deviating from the base rate in such cases relies implicitly on the unsupported assumption 
that the celebrity effect (or the effect of any similar characteristic of the promotion that is being forecast) 
is not already embedded in the base rate. However, information in a narrative form is always likely to act 
as a powerful distractor from the base rate, even though its diagnosticity is unknown (Önkal, Sayım, & 
Gönül, 2013).  For example, in a classic study of judgmental decision-making, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) showed that information on statistical base rates is often neglected or discounted, with unreliable 
narrative information being preferred. Kahneman and Lovallo’s (1993) notion of the ‘inside view’ also 
suggests that the availability of a set of reasons as to why a promotion will or will not be a success will 
cause attention to be devoted to the specific characteristics of the particular promotion that is being 
forecast. As a result, the focus on average sales uplifts (the ‘outside view’) will be lost. The above 
discussion suggests the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Adjustments to statistical baseline forecasts in order to take into account forthcoming promotion 
effects will deviate from base rates when information with no, or unknown, diagnosticity is provided. 
 
How might a focus on the most recent promotion be translated into an adjusted forecast? One 
possibility is for people to employ the anchor-and-adjust heuristic (Bolger & Harvey, 1993; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), with the statistical baseline 
forecast acting as an anchor.  This would lead to the forecast being formed as a weighted average of the 
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baseline statistical forecast and the previous promotion, resulting in a forecast that fell between the two 
values, and leading, on average, to an underestimate of the promotion effect. Ironically, the use of a 
weighted average implies that higher statistical forecasts lead to smaller percentage adjustments, because 
in such cases the statistical forecast will be closer to the uplifted sales achieved in the previous promotion. 
An alternative suggested by de Baets and Harvey (2018) is to use a weighted average of the estimated 
series mean and the statistical forecast as an initial anchor. Clearly, the presence of sales uplifts reflecting 
multiple past promotions would be expected to have a significant upward effect on the estimated series 
mean, compared to cases where only a single past promotion is observed. Nevertheless, their study also 
found a tendency to under-adjust from this anchor, and hence, typically, to underestimate promotion 
effects when multiple past promotions were observed. 
In addition, when a forecaster has access to multiple items of qualitative information, of which 
some are positive (suggesting that the promotion will be a relative success) and some are negative 
(suggesting the contrary), there is some evidence to suggest that the negative information may be more 
potent (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This is consistent with Prospect Theory, which assumes that people 
have an aversion to losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and hence may be more vigilant in their 
response to negative information that indicates a potential loss than they would be to positive information. 
The reasons for the greater influence of negative information are complex, but researchers such as Peeters 
and Czapinski (1990) have suggested that though negative events are rarer in many environments, they 
can have more important implications for survival, meaning that it pays to be especially watchful for 
dangerous negative events. In our context, this negativity bias implies that there may be a tendency to 
underestimate future promotion effects in situations where positive and negative reasons are equally 
likely to be present and their diagnosticity is unknown. These factors lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Adjustments made to statistical baseline forecasts in order to take into account the effects of 
forthcoming promotions will tend to underestimate these effects when information with no, or unknown, 
diagnosticity is provided. 
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In summary, when information relating to a forthcoming promotion is provided as part of the 
S&OP forecasting process, whether in quantitative, graphical or qualitative forms, the literature suggests 
that information with zero or unknown diagnosticity is likely to distract a demand forecaster from the 
normative base rate for promotional events.  
 
2.2. Moderating factors 
In practical contexts, there are a number of other factors that may moderate the extent to which both the 
latest promotion and qualitative information arising from S&OP discussions lead to a tendency to under-
forecast future promotion effects (de Baets, 2017). Before commencing the forecasting task, forecasters 
may have a prior view of the probable impact of promotions based on their (potentially imperfect) recall 
of earlier promotions (Reimers & Harvey, 2011), their own experiences, or industry beliefs. This may 
also serve to reduce the weight that is attached to the base rate. Secondly, forecasters in organizations 
may be subject to motivating factors that cause them to bias their forecasts, whether consciously or 
unconsciously. The forecaster’s motivation may also affect the way in which sets of information in verbal 
statements will be assessed and aggregated for forecasting (Eroglu & Croxton, 2010). In some situations, 
forecasters may prefer the variable being forecast to take on high or low values (e.g., a desire for high 
sales). Such a desirability of outcomes may lead to an overblown optimism that is referred to as a 
‘desirability bias’ (e.g., Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010). As Oliva and Watson’s (2009) case 
study shows, such a bias is a common feature of the S&OP forecasting process.  
Despite these potential biases, forecasters in organizations are also likely to be motivated to 
produce accurate forecasts. Indeed, supply chain forecasters identified accuracy as their most important 
objective in Fildes and Goodwin’s (2007) survey. Moreover, prestige and reputational concerns and the 
knowledge that one’s forecast will be evaluated may lead to a ‘reality constraint’, potentially tempering 
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factors that may favor biased forecasts, whether overly optimistic or overly pessimistic (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999).  
In addition to motivational influences, forecasters all come to the task with relevant past 
experience, which may affect the weightings that they give to the different pieces of information with 
which they are presented, whether in a real S&OP process or a simulated process. This has been observed 
before with auditors (Shelton, 1999), while, in demand forecasting, Franses (2014) found that more 
experienced forecasters in a pharmaceutical company produced more accurate adjustments.  
Finally, the most recent sales figure (as opposed to sales in the most recent promotion period) and 
the most recent forecast error may have an influence on the size of the adjustment that is made for the 
forthcoming promotion. For example, an additional upward adjustment might be made to reflect a 
relatively high last observation, as it might be viewed as mirroring a recent change in the baseline level of 
sales (e.g., a recent increase in the popularity of a product). If this observation was well above the forecast 
for that period (thus leading to a large positive forecast error), its salience, and hence its influence on the 
adjustment, is likely to be enhanced. 
In summary, little is known about the way in which forecasters use the information that they face 
when producing their judgmental adjustments of statistical baseline forecasts when products are due to be 
promoted. However, it is an important issue, in that inaccurate demand forecasts can be costly in terms of 
either surplus inventory or the loss of customer goodwill and sales. It is also important theoretically, in 
that little research has examined the general problem of which this is an example: the interpretation of 
diverse information in a time series context. The remainder of this paper investigates whether and how 
information of different types distracts forecasters from using base rate information efficiently, leading to 
a decreased accuracy.  
 
3.  Methodology and design of Experiment 1 
We have adopted a behavioural experimental approach here for testing the hypothesis developed above, 
while controlling for prior expectations of promotion effects, self-reported knowledge of forecasting and 
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different types of motivation. Controlled laboratory experiments are being used increasingly to investigate 
demand forecasting behaviors and related biases (Kremer, Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011; Siemsen, 2011; 
Harvey & Reimers, 2013; Moritz, Siemsen, & Kremer, 2014), as they allow for systematized 
examinations of crucial factors that affect the forecasting performance. They are also now common in the 
operations literature (Gans & Croson, 2008; Croson, Schultz, Siemsen, & Yeo, 2013; Zhao, Zhao, & Wu, 
2013).  
We report in detail on one experiment (labelled Experiment 1) that was built on the experience 
gained from a number of preliminary experiments. The responses in these preliminary experiments 
provided information on features such as screen design and the number of time series that could be used, 
as we discuss below. The participants in Experiment 1 were management students who were studying for 
bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees at the Universities of Bath (UK), Bilkent (Turkey), and Lancaster 
(UK). They had all studied some forecasting. While they did not have the same level of experience as 
commercial forecasters, they did have at least as much statistical training as many practicing forecasters. 
The evidence provided by earlier studies, and recently by Kremer et al. (2016), suggests strongly that 
there are few differences between student participants and practising forecasters in contexts such as that 
simulated here. We pick up on this issue in a second experiment that involved executives, as is discussed 
below. 
The participants were asked to assume the role of forecasters for a large company that supplies a 
wide range of products to supermarkets. They were told that their task was to predict the sales of a 
number of these products that would be subject to a sales promotion. Each participant was given a 
briefing that described the task, together with base rate information on the average percentage uplift in 
sales that was achieved by promotions at this supermarket.  
Once the experiment had started, other information was provided through an FSS , including a 
graphical display (see Figure 1 for a typical screenshot) that was designed to have features and a format 
that were similar to those found in some widely used commercial forecasting systems (e.g. 
ForecastProTM). The realism of both the system and the participants’ task was intended to enhance the 
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ecological validity of our experimental task and its findings (Rogers & Soopramanien, 2009), and was 
based on our earlier field-based research in companies (Goodwin et al., 2007; Fildes et al., 2009). This 
was considered especially important because many experimental tasks in the extant literature do not allow 
the assessment of the combinations of factors that apply in practical contexts, and the current task was 
structured so as to replicate the forecaster’s everyday experiences on the job as closely as possible. 
Key elements in the design of the task include the length of the sales history presented graphically 
(24 periods), the number of past sales promotions (here chosen as one, a simplification for promotion-
intensive products), the types of products (we aimed for everyday products that would be familiar to 
participants) and the promotional information. The demand generating process and the forecast function 
(described below) were also chosen to replicate the types of series and forecasting methods that practicing 
demand forecasters face; thus, exponential smoothing has been used (for example, all of the companies 
examined by Fildes et al., 2009, and Alvarado-Valencia, Barrero, Önkal, & Dennerlein, 2017, used this as 
the basis of their forecasting and adjustment process). The choice of the average uplift may also be 
important. An analysis of the promotional effects reported by companies provided a wide range of 
possible average uplifts, with Nakamura, Pechey, Suhrcke, Jebb, and Marteau (2014) estimating a range 
of 20% to 40% ,while an analysis of US store data gave much higher estimates, with a range of 127% to 
519%.2 These estimates gave us a wide choice, and an early experiment using 80% was contrasted with 
participants’ prior views (which provided a median estimate of 50%). Since this last figure was within the 
range of plausible uplift values, we chose to use it in the experiments reported here. This average uplift 
was highlighted both in the cover story and in the information presented on the computer screen during 
the trial run. 
The participants first saw product details for a particular SKU (the SKUs were presented in random 
order), a corresponding time series sales history of 24 periods, and the corresponding statistical forecasts 
for all periods, including the 25th.  
                                            
2 Thanks are due to Shaohui Ma, who provided these figures as part of research reported by Ma, Fildes, 
and Huang (2016).  
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The data were generated according to the rules: 
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The initial BaselineForecast was set to 200, with a promotional effect of between 80 and 120 units, so 
that it was, on average, 50% of the typical sales in non-promotion periods. The past promotional period 
occurred at a random point over the 24-period history. The standard deviation (stddev) had a value of 
either 40 or 80. On the rare occasions where the simulated observation turned out to be negative, a value 
of zero was substituted.  
The FSS provided a simple exponential smoothing forecast, as shown, apart from a random 
perturbation in period 25. This was done by assigning each series a value of zero, or ±50*U(0.4,0.6), i.e., 
a random perturbation of between 20 and 30 in absolute value. This limited the collinearity between the 
forecast, the previous sales observation and the previous error, thus allowing its influence on the 
adjustment to be estimated more precisely. It was made clear to the participants that the baseline forecast 
did not include any promotional effects, as the previous baseline forecast was not updated for promoted 
periods, t. The timing of the single promotion in the historical data was generated uniformly for an integer 
period between 1 and 24. The timing and effect of this promotion varied across SKUs, with a mean sales 
uplift of 50% (relative to the baseline forecast). 
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Figure 1. Screenshot of the experimental forecasting support system. 
For each SKU, in addition to the historical sales series and statistical forecast, the screen 
displayed between zero and four written statements which gave reasons as to why the level of sales uplift 
in the forthcoming promotional effect might be expected to be above or below the average (‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ reasons). These reasons related to the amount spent on the promotion (e.g., “Over £1m is being 
spent on the promotion, double the usual size”), market research (e.g., “Focus groups have been quite 
negative about the promotional packs, but we can’t change these at this late stage”), weather factors (e.g., 
“This product is mainly sold in the North where the weather conditions should be good for high sales 
according to the latest forecast”) and campaign effectiveness (e.g., “We were hoping for a celebrity 
endorsement of our product as part of the campaign, but negotiations have not been successful and, 
unfortunately, we will have to run the campaign without this endorsement”), with a total of four reason 
types. These reasons were tested on nine experts for their plausibility and relevance to promotional 
events. A full list of the reasons is available from the authors. Half of them were positive and half were 
negative, with 12 in each category for each of the four reason types. The number of reasons displayed at 
any one time, the appearance of positive or negative reasons and the order of their display were all 
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randomized. Finally, having been presented with all of this information, the participants were invited to 
use their judgment to adjust the baseline forecast for each SKU so as to take into account the forthcoming 
promotion for that product. These statements, which are typical of the issues that arise in S&OP 
discussions (see Goodwin et al., 2007), had no impact on the simulated promotional effects. In 
organizational S&OP, there is typically no evidence of such information having an effect on the impact of 
promotions (although an exception has been observed in brewing, see Nikolopoulos & Fildes, 2013). 
In order to control for the possible moderating effect of motivation, each participant was assigned 
randomly to one of three treatments that were designed to provide different types of motivation. The first 
group were told that they would be rewarded when a promotion uplift exceeded 50%; although this was 
beyond their control, it was thought that the possibility of this reward might lead to a desirability bias. 
The second group were told that they would be rewarded for the accuracy of their forecasts. Finally, the 
third (control) group were given a reward merely for participating in the experiment. In the first and 
second groups, the best two forecasters in each treatment received an Amazon voucher, while a prize 
draw was used to select the two winners in the control group. This led to a 3 (motivation type) between-
subjects  12 (SKUs) within-subjects design.  
Before embarking on the experiment, the participants were asked to indicate their prior view of 
what a typical percentage sales uplift would be for a fast-moving consumer good that was being 
promoted. They then made forecasts for the two SKUs that were used as a trial run in order to familiarize 
themselves with the FSS, before making forecasts for the 12 additional SKUs that formed the basis of the 
experiment. For each SKU, they had the option of indicating which, if any, of the reasons displayed had 
led them to make their adjustment. During the trial run, they were provided with an assessment of why the 
earlier promotion had or had not been a success, though no empirical evidence was produced to support 
the assessment. They also received overall feedback on their accuracy after making forecasts for both 
trial-run SKUs. No feedback was provided in the main part of the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment, each participant completed a questionnaire that was designed to assess their knowledge of 
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forecasting, their engagement in the task, their expectations regarding the accuracy of their judgmental 
adjustments, and their interpretation of the reasons that were provided. 
Because of the complexity of designing experiments that provide a realistic simulation of the 
supply-chain forecaster’s task, a number of preliminary experiments were run, involving over 200 
participants. These enabled us to fine-tune the design and the screen display, in order to eliminate 
potential confounding factors and identify the key issues that merited further investigation. These 
variations included using different numbers of series, providing fixed numbers of reasons, forcing 
participants to select both primary and secondary reasons to support their adjustments, having an average 
promotional uplift of 80%, and including a trend in the data. The results of these experiments were 
consistent with those that we discuss next, suggesting that our results are robust. Thus, these earlier 
results will not be reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available from the authors. 
4. Analysis and results of Experiment 1 
The experiment involved 126 participants. We then excluded respondents who made only the very 
smallest average adjustments (i.e., their mean adjustment was less than zero), as this suggests either a 
limited understanding of promotional effects in retailing or no engagement with the experiments. Thus, 
the results are based on a sample of 112 participants. As was indicated above, the participants also 
responded to a post-experimental questionnaire. The main results of interest are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 Questionnaire responses.  
Question 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev. 
Rating of overall knowledge of demand forecasting 2.77 0.86 
Expectations of statistical forecast performance 3.03 0.77 
The reasons provided had a direct influence on my forecasts 3.46 1.07 
Confidence in my final adjusted forecast 2.66 0.94 
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Scale: (1) none / low expectations, to (5) high / high expectations (depending on the question). 
 
The results show that the participants were generally motivated by the experiment and responded to 
the reasons provided. In general, they did not ‘write-off’ the potential performance of the statistical 
baseline forecasts, despite the fact that they were bound to have large errors in a promotion period. This 
may reflect some acknowledgment of the usefulness of the statistical forecasts in establishing a reliable 
baseline for judgmental adjustment. The participants also indicated a lack of confidence in the accuracy of 
their adjusted forecasts, which is reasonable given the level of uncertainty that is associated with such 
promotion effects. 
We conducted a preliminary data analysis prior to developing a full linear model, to explain the 
size of the participants’ adjustments. The participants’ median prior estimate of the percentage uplift 
achieved in supermarket promotions was 50%. However, their median estimated uplift during the 
experiment was only 30%, which is significantly lower (p < 0.001) than the base rate of 50%, a result that 
is consistent with a neglect of the base rate. This provides support for both H1 and H2. The distribution of 
these percentage adjustments was broadly normal, with a few positive outliers. Only 25% of the 
adjustments were greater than the base rate of 50%. However, some were as high as 200%, which is quite 
possible for the sorts of products that were included in our experimental design.  
 
4.1. Statistical modelling 
Statistical modelling was used to identify the factors that helped to determine the sizes of participants’ 
adjustments, and in particular, whether the previous promotion effect and reasons were distracting them 
from the base rate. This also enabled us to estimate the extent of any distraction, after taking into account 
the potential moderating factors discussed in Section 2.2. The nature of the experiment, where each 
respondent is given a sequence of series in random order, together with random information cues, requires 
Motivation to engage with the task 3.40 0.98 
18 
 
a more sophisticated analysis than a standard ANOVA or regression. Individual participants can be 
expected to have random responses to both the series and the cues. The advantages of using linear mixed 
effects models for this situation (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2000) have been summarized as that “they 
allow the researcher to simultaneously consider all factors that potentially contribute to the understanding 
of the structure of the data….including standard fixed effects ….. and covariates” compared to standard 
approaches (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The statistical model is as follows: 
 (0, )
(0, )
i i i i
i
X Z
N
N
   i
i i
Y β b ε
b D
ε Σ
 , 
where Yi is the ni dimensional response vector for respondent i, representing the promotional estimates 
for the jth series. Xi and Zi are the ni  p and ni  q dimensional matrices of the factors that influence the 
response, while  is the p-dimensional vector of fixed treatment effects and bi  is the q-dimensional vector 
of random effects. The covariance matrices are potentially important to the model building. D and  are 
assumed to be independent. A repeated measures design is needed because the observations of the 
promotional uplift estimates from a given subject cannot be assumed to be independent of each other; for 
example, in the sequence in which they were made. The standard assumption that is made for the 
variance-covariance matrix of the random effects, D, is that the respective variances of the bi differ from 
each other but are independent of each other; this is called the variance component assumption. In 
addition, the sensitivity of the estimated effects to changes in this assumption has been tested through an 
assumed autoregressive structure in order to capture any carry-over effect between the repeated 
observations, i.e., an AR(1) structure was assumed for D. SAS 9.3 has been used to estimate the equations 
using a restricted maximum likelihood.  
The key features of the linear mixed effects model are set out below: 
• The dependent variable is the adjustment percentage transformed into log (1 + 
Proportional_uplift) to ensure better error distributional characteristics (Davydenko & Fildes, 
2013).  
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• The effects of variables relating to the past forecast history were assumed to be random effects, as 
they depend on the individual participant. These variables were: the log of the respondent’s prior 
estimates of promotional effects, the log of the last forecast percentage error (measured as 
log(Forecast/Actual)), the log of the uplift achieved in the last promotion (i.e., actual promoted 
sales over the baseline forecast), the log of the latest forecast for the promoted period, and the 
timing of the previous promotion. 
• The effect of the series noise variance was treated as a fixed effects class variable.  
• Participants’ responses to the information cues were treated as random effects specific to the 
individuals. 
• The numbers of positive and negative reasons were treated as fixed effects class variables, i.e., 
treatments. 
Formally, let Yij= log (1+Proportional_uplift), the uplift estimated by the ith participant for the jth series. 
Then, the model being estimated is 
0 1 2 3
4 5
* ln( _ _ ) * ln( _ ) * ln( _ _ )
* ln(Pr ) * ( _ )
ij i j i j i j
i i j i j i ij ij
Y Last promotional uplift Last Actual Current Stat forecast
ior Noise Timing_past promotion Reasncat error
   
   
   
    
, 
where β1,… β4, are random effects, Noise is treated as fixed, and Reasncat is treated as random.  
Reasncat is defined as the number of positive reasons minus the number of negative reasons. In addition, 
the results presented have points of high leverage removed, where leverage was measured using Cook’s D 
(eliminating points with D > 0.002 – approximating one of the recommended cut-offs of 4/n). Various 
modelling choices also needed to be resolved, and in particular, how to characterize the numbers of 
negative and positive reasons. On a methodological note, we sought to test the robustness of our chosen 
approach by examining alternatives, since there is no ‘optimal’ route to establishing a model. Several 
alternatives were considered, including using both variables (with an interaction) and one variable 
together with the difference between the numbers of positive and negative reasons. Using the variable 
Reasncat (the number of positive reasons minus the number of negative reasons, as defined above) proved 
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the most parsimonious specification, with the minimum BIC. In addition, various interactions were also 
included, but did not add any explanatory power. Any non-linear effect of timing was also checked, but a 
linear model proved adequate. A sensitivity check on the assumption of the correlation structure of the 
repeated measures did not show any substantive differences. 
4.2. Results of modelling 
The results from the model are shown in Table 2, which, as stated earlier, excludes observations 
with high leverages. However, as a check on the robustness of our findings, the results from estimating 
the model with the full set of observations remained broadly the same (1560 observations were reduced to 
1309 after excluding high leverage points and non-compliant responders). The parameter coefficients are 
interpreted as percentage effects, meaning that, for example, having four negative reasons and no positive 
reasons (Reasncat = –4) lowers the average adjustment by 10.1% (= 100[1 – exp(–0.1067)]). It can be 
seen that both the previous promotion uplift and the reasons were associated significantly with the 
adjustments made by the participants, which is consistent with H1. Higher uplifts in the previous 
promotion were associated with higher adjustments. This effect was slightly greater for more recent 
promotions. As expected, lower levels of noise were also associated with higher estimated uplifts, 
suggesting that high noise was making the effects of the previous promotion less salient. The significant 
negative coefficient for the statistical baseline forecast is consistent with participants placing their 
estimate of the uplifted sales between the baseline forecast and the previous promotion. This would 
account for the tendency to underestimate the expected uplift of 50%. 
Table 2. Model of the adjustment: dependent variable is loge(1 + Proportional_uplift). 
Effect Estimate p-value 
Intercept 0.505 <0.0001 
ln(last promotion uplift) 0.275 <0.0001 
ln (last actual) 0.037 0.001 
ln (last stats forecast error) 0.040 0.105 
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Notes: Available n = 1560; sample size after deleting high leverage points = 1309. Reasncat = 
No. of positive reasons supplied – No. of negative reasons. 
 All tests are one-sided apart from that for low noise (and intercept).  
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between loge(1+Proportional_uplift) and the difference between the 
numbers of positive and negative reasons. The effects are compared with situations where there are equal 
numbers of positive and negative reasons. It can be seen that, in general, the greater the number of 
positive reasons relative to the number of negative, the larger the upward adjustment. This suggests that 
the participants were balancing the reasons against each other, indicating that they were using a 
compensatory strategy. Broadly speaking, the greater the balance of reasons in one direction, the greater 
the distraction from the base rate, despite the unknown diagnosticity of these reasons, a result that is 
consistent with H1. 
Did negative reasons have a greater influence than positive reasons? An analysis of ‘contrasts’ 
showed that one more positive reason has a greater impact than one more negative reason, but there is 
little difference between having two more positive and two more negative reasons. Overall, the results 
suggest that positive reasons have a slightly greater effect than negative ones. This supports the argument 
that the propensity to underestimate the promotion effects is a result of the tendency to place the adjusted 
forecast between the baseline forecast and the previous promotion, rather than the alternative of a greater 
weight being attached to negative reasons. 
ln(current stats forecast) –0.128 <0.0001 
ln(Prior) 0.035 0.014 
Low noise 0.021 0.018 
Timing of past promotion 0.001 0.036 
Reasncat = –4 –0.107 <0.0001 
Reasncat = –3 –0.136 <0.0001 
Reasncat = –2 –0.114 <0.0001 
Reasncat = –1 –0.077 <0.0001 
Reasncat = 0 –0.078 <0.0001 
Reasncat = 1 –0.052 0.001 
Reasncat = 2 –0.023 0.112 
Reasncat = 3 –0.027 0.100 
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We investigated whether any of a number of additional variables had a moderating effect on the 
results. Table 2 shows that participants who came to the experiment with higher prior expectations of 
promotion uplifts tended to make larger upwards adjustments to the baseline forecasts. However, the 
carry-over effect of this to their individual SKU adjustments was small (as shown by the coefficient of the 
ln(Prior)). There was also an apparent country effect between the participants based in the UK and 
Turkey (p < 0.001), with the latter providing lower forecasts of uplifts. Once individual priors were 
included, the effect was insignificant. This probably reflects the different retail environments that the 
participants were familiar with. In addition, Table 2 shows that the adjustments tended to be larger when 
the most recent actual sales figure was higher (this always turned out to be a non-promotion period). As 
has been discussed, a high recent sales figure might be interpreted as a signal that the underlying level of 
sales has increased, so that a greater adjustment to the statistical forecast is needed. 
 
Figure 2. Effects on respondents’ estimates of the uplift of differences between the numbers 
of positive and negative reasons.  
Note: The effects are measured relative to situations where there are equal numbers of positive 
and negative reasons. The dependent variable is loge(1+Proportional_uplift). 
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There were no other substantive or significant effects on the size of the adjustment in regard to 
either the different motivation treatments or the characteristics of the participants, such as their 
knowledge of statistical forecasting, apart from the finding that participants’ motivation in the task proved 
significant in increasing their average uplift. Telling participants that they would be rewarded if the uplift 
exceeded 50% (in an attempt to induce desirability bias) had no significant effect, nor did rewarding 
accuracy. 
4.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that, when making their forecasts, participants were 
distracted from the 50% base rate by the previous promotion uplift and by the reasons given, despite this 
information having either no or unknown diagnosticity. In particular, they appeared to set their adjustment 
to be between the baseline statistical forecast and the previous promotion, resulting in a tendency to 
under-forecast the forthcoming promotion effect. These findings are consistent with earlier results on base 
rate neglect, which suggest that base rates are eclipsed by more salient information with a potentially 
lower predictive value. In fact, the introduction of any reasons surrounding the promotion had a negative 
effect on the calibration of the adjustment, a result that we establish by comparing situations in which no 
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reasons were offered with those in which positive and negative reasons counterbalanced each other. It 
appears that the availability of any reasons will distract forecasters from the base rate. Our findings also 
replicate studies that show that managers introduce variation into a system even when they know that the 
demand is constant, as our participants did when they departed from the 50% uplift (Sterman & Dogan, 
2015).  
None of our motivation treatments, which were intended to control for possible motivational 
effects, had a significant effect on the size of the adjustments. The absence of a desirability bias for those 
who were rewarded for higher than average uplifts was perhaps surprising, and once again demonstrates 
that it is difficult to replicate motivational and the associated political effects that occur in the field in the 
laboratory. A small reward of a voucher for higher or more accurate sales forecasts is not the same as the 
incentive to please the boss with a high forecast or the incentive to bring prestige and resources to one’s 
department by producing reliable forecasts.  
 
5. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, the participants had access to both sorts of potentially distracting information 
cues, namely the previous promotion uplift and the reasons. This did not allow the effects of information 
with zero diagnosticity and information with unknown diagnosticity to be examined separately. 
Experiment 2 had a simpler design. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two treatments. In the 
‘previous promotion’ treatment, the series contained sales obtained in a previous promotion, but no 
reasons relating to the forthcoming promotion were displayed. In the ‘reasons’ treatment, reasons for the 
success or otherwise of the forthcoming promotion were displayed, but no previous promotion effects 
appeared in the time series. In this case, two negative reasons, two positive reasons or zero reasons were 
displayed for each SKU, with the number of reasons being selected at random. The design was based on 
the results of the previous experiment, where the influential variable proved to be the difference between 
the number of positive reasons offered and the number of negative reasons. The effects proved to be 
approximately linear, between –2 and 2 reasons. In the ‘reasons’ treatment, the promotion always 
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appeared in period 18, thus eliminating any possible timing effects. Unlike Experiment 1, there was no 
random perturbation of the statistical baseline forecast and no motivation treatments were included. Each 
participant made forecasts for period 25 for 14 series, including two trial series. In all other respects, the 
experiment was the same as Experiment 1. 
 The participants were 30 executives who were undertaking an Executive MBA module on 
forecasting, so the experiment also enabled us to test whether the effects observed in Experiment 1 were 
also valid for experienced executives. 
 
5.1. Results of Experiment 2 
While the two sets of cues, past promotions and reasons, can be embedded in a single analytical 
model, our analysis shows that there are interaction effects that annul any efficiency gains in the 
estimation of coefficients. Hence, separate mixed linear effects models were estimated for the adjustments 
made by participants in the two treatments. The overall mean (median) adjustment made was 49.4% 
(39.8%). The models had the same underlying structure as that used to analyse Experiment 1, except that 
the number of positive reasons minus the number of negative reasons was represented by a single variable 
rather than a series of dummy variables, reflecting the approximately linear relationship referred to above. 
As before, the dependent variable was loge(1 + Proportional_uplift) and high leverage points were 
removed. This time, ln(last actual) and ln(last stats forecast error) were not included in the list of 
independent variables, because the lack of random perturbation in the statistical forecast meant that they 
would be collinear with that forecast.  
The results from the group of executives taking part in this experiment generally support those 
reported for the earlier experiment. As Table 3 showed, for the ‘previous promotion’ group, the previous 
promotion had a highly significant effect on the estimated uplift for the forthcoming promotion. Also, as 
in Experiment 1, a lower level of noise led to higher estimated uplifts, which is consistent with the notion 
that the effect of the previous promotion was less salient under conditions of high noise. However, unlike 
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Experiment 1, a higher statistical forecast was associated with a larger upward adjustment, probably due 
to multicollinearity with the last actual (which was broken in Experiment 1). The effect of these factors 
was that the overall adjustment had a (trimmed) mean of 43% and a median of 40% (which is not 
significantly different from 50%, but is substantially and significantly less than the observed means of the 
past promotions, 57.5%).  
Table 3 shows that participants in the ‘reasons’ group were influenced significantly by the 
reasons provided when they estimated the promotion uplift. The greater the balance in favour of positive 
reasons, the greater the upwards adjustment that they tended to make. For this group, the mean estimate 
when no reasons were provided was 52% (close to the base rate), although the median estimate was only 
43%. As with the ‘previous promotion’ group, higher statistical forecasts were associated with larger 
upward adjustments, but this more experienced group was fixed more firmly on their prior promotional 
estimates. However, as expected, the level of noise did not have a significant effect, as there was no 
previous promotion uplift to be submerged in high noise. 
 
Table 3  Model of promotional adjustment for the two treatments: ‘Previous promotion’ and 
‘Reasons’. 
 
Treatment 1: 
Previous promotion 
Treatment 2: 
Reasons 
Effect Estimate 
(n = 159) 
p-value Estimate 
(n = 161) 
p-value 
Intercept –4.830 <0.001 –2.946 0.001 
ln(last promotion uplift) 0.678 <0.001 n/a n/a 
ln(current stats forecast) 0.889 0.001 0.598 0.003 
ln(Prior) 0.418 0.153 1.160 0.133 
Low noise  0.190 0.001 –0.022 0.608 
No. of positive reasons minus 
no. of negative reasons n/a n/a 0.032 0.0416 
Mean adjustment 51.9   46.6  
Median adjustment 42.9   33.8  
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Note: All tests are one-sided except for those for low noise and the intercept. 
 
In conclusion, Experiment 2 clearly demonstrated that, when the information cues were presented 
separately, both past promotions with zero diagnosticity and qualitative information with unknown 
diagnosticity distracted participants’ estimates of promotional adjustments from the normative adjustment 
of 50%. This provides further support for H1. Also, the effects observed earlier with a diverse group of 
business students have been replicated with experienced executives. However, the support for H2 
(concerning the effects of information on under-adjustment) was weaker, with the mean and median 
adjustments being closer to 50% than in Experiment 1, though they were still generally below this figure. 
This may be because each group in the experiment had only one main source of potential distraction 
(either the previous promotion or the reasons). The lower average adjustments for the ‘reasons’ group 
may reflect a tendency to anchor on the baseline forecast, and the fact that this group did not observe a 
previous promotion that might have ‘pulled’ their estimates away from the anchor. 
 
6. General discussion and conclusions  
The efficient use of information by demand forecasters can be crucial, given the negative effects 
of forecast errors on production, distribution and inventory planning. For example, Kremer et al. (2016) 
estimate that a given percentage improvement in accuracy translates into a similar percentage reduction in 
safety stock. Given their repercussions for the supply chain, promotions pose particularly strong 
challenges to S&OP decision-makers. The results of this experiment-based study suggest that the 
provision of information relating to promotions can be detrimental to the forecast accuracy when it has 
either no or unknown diagnosticity, in spite of its salience. This finding has important implications for 
both the design of the forecasting support systems that are used commonly in supply-chain-based 
organizations and the extent to which supply chains can operate efficiently. The systems typically 
emphasise the provision of information to the forecaster in an amenable and accessible format, 
irrespective of its predictive value. However, our results suggest that these ‘passive’ systems may be 
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inimical to accuracy. In particular, the participants appeared to adopt a version of the ‘last-lift’ heuristic, 
the most common promotional forecasting method used in practice. Their mistake was to ignore the 
average uplift, focusing instead on the last observed value.  
Both facets of the participants’ sub-optimal forecasting suggest that FSSs need to be redesigned. 
Systems that actively evaluate and filter information before presenting it may lead to improvements in 
accuracy. Parikh, Fazlollahi, and Verma (2001) found that FSSs which provided informative guidance, 
which they defined as the provision of unbiased, relevant information without a specific suggestion, were 
superior in promoting learning relative to systems that suggested how the information should be used. 
However, the emphasis needs to be on the provision of diagnostic and salient information. For example, 
in promotion forecasting, a laboratory study found a system that identifies analogous past promotions and 
provides estimates of their average effects to improve the forecast accuracy (Lee, Goodwin, Fildes, 
Nikolopoulos, & Lawrence, 2007). However, as Lim and O’Connor (1995) and now Dietvorst, Simmons, 
and Massey (2015) have shown, changing forecasters’ habit of misweighting information remains 
difficult. Such intentional and unintentional misuses of information, and the prevalence of habitual 
(mis)weighting schemes, further support the call for an effective redesign of FSSs in order to aid 
predictive performance. However, redesigning the organization’s FSS alone is not sufficient, as the S&OP 
process also impacts information sharing and the salience of individual pieces of information that are 
thought to be relevant but are of unknown diagnosticity. As a consequence, the FSS and the S&OP 
process need to be considered together, incorporating some of the ideas laid out by Oliva and Watson 
(2009). The research question that this raises is whether an S&OP process that incorporates an analytical 
‘notes’ system into the supporting FSS and attempts to summarize past promotions (perhaps via short 
stories that include explanations of the available information and reasons for selecting a particular 
forecasting model(s)) could be effective. In addition, the influence of prior beliefs about the effectiveness 
of promotions merits further attention. The psychological research on conservatism indicates that such 
beliefs can be difficult to change in some circumstances, despite the provision of base rate information 
(Hilbert, 2012). However, Gaeth and Shanteau (1984) suggest that training may help, and there is some 
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support for the idea that more experienced forecasters, like the auditors considered by Shelton (1999), 
may be less prone to strong responses to irrelevant qualitative information (as may have been the case in 
our second experiment). 
Is the underestimation of promotion effects that we found in our laboratory experiments typical of 
what happens in the field? The evidence is sparse. Our study suggests that the bias is a result of the poor 
design of the FSS, but no field study has provided details of either the characteristics of the specific FSS 
that was used in promotion forecasting or the role it played, if one was used at all. Some field studies have 
reported that judgmental adjustments tend to suffer from an optimism bias (Fildes et al., 2009; Franses & 
Legerstee, 2011), but Müller (2011) reached the opposite conclusion. However, these studies focused on 
adjustment behaviours in all periods, rather than specifically in promotion periods. Further work on the 
forecasting of promotional events is clearly needed in order to disentangle the confounding factors, 
including the effects of a promotion forecast.  
An obvious question is: how were the participants expected to know that the information that they were 
presented with had either no or unknown diagnosticity? However, a deeper reflection reveals that the 
diagnosticity of the information was self-evident. A sample of just one previous promotion, when the 
promotion effects are subject to unknown levels of variation and the average promotional uplift is known, 
clearly lacks diagnosticity. The presentation of reasons, such as, “In this campaign, we will outspend our 
competitors by 100%”, without any supporting information on the typical effect of this factor on the 
number of units sold, means that the reasons self-evidently had an unknown diagnosticity. While the 
failure of participants to discount the extraneous information may not have been a surprise, our model has 
enabled us to measure the degree to which different types of such information impact judgmental 
forecasts in a realistic situation. The evidence that we present shows that the range of information that is 
taken into account is wide, and damaging to the accuracy. 
However, like most experimental studies, this work has limitations. One issue is that the participants 
may have felt obliged to deviate from the 50% base rate, otherwise why were they being invited to take 
part in the experiment? Simply entering a 50% uplift for every SKU may have seemed too easy, or may 
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have been perceived as signaling disengagement from the forecasting task. In this respect, though, the 
experiment was an accurate reflection of the field. For example, Fildes et al. (2009) found that forecasters 
in companies tended to make lots of unjustified adjustments to statistical forecasts. There is evidence that 
forecasting staff often make these adjustments in order to signal that they care about the forecasts 
produced, to display a sense of ownership of the forecasts, or simply to justify their organizational roles 
(Önkal & Gönül, 2005). Having information that provides an apparent rationale for such adjustments is 
likely to increase their prevalence. 
The participation of students in Experiment 1 may be regarded as another limitation, despite their 
motivation and knowledge of forecasting. However, this is unlikely to affect the substantive conclusions, 
as Experiment 2 indicated (see also Kremer et al., 2016). In addition, while the on-screen simulation 
mirrored the operational realities of forecasting closely, the demand model and the promotional effects 
were based on a simple statistical model. The results may also depend on the features of the baseline 
statistical model, where the smoothing parameter is known to affect responses (Kremer et al., 2011). 
Building on the results presented here, when much of the information available to the forecaster has no 
diagnosticity, it would be useful for future research to examine the behaviors of forecasters when the 
statistical model captures some promotional drivers. A second issue is whether the different types of 
information examined here (or observed in the S&OP process) are interpreted differently and given 
different weights when adjustments are made. A limited investigation supports this view. 
In summary, there appears to be substantial scope for design innovations in forecasting systems, 
given the limitations of the current systems (Fildes, Goodwin, & Lawrence, 2006). These may include 
structured support for the filtering and integration of qualitative and quantitative information, targeted to 
individual forecasters, as well as support in the design of collaborative forecasting systems that reach 
across different supply chain partners operating under diverse information platforms. These suggestions 
have implications for the organizational design of the S&OP process, and further work on such 
innovations promises to enhance the communication between forecasters and decision makers, with an 
extensive impact on the supply chain performance overall. 
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